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The Horsemen of Classical Athens: 




 In the late 430s the cavalry-corps consisted of 1000 horsemen and 200 mounted 
archers. It was a legal requirement of elite Athenians to serve as horsemen. While the 
state subsidised their corps-membership, it still personally cost them about 10 times 
what hoplites had to pay. After the Peloponnesian War, when this subsidy was reduced, 
a horseman had to be a man of independent means. Therefore all horsemen had to come 
from wealthy families, because only they could shoulder the associated costs. These 
1000 members joined the corps, when they were 20 years old, and retired in their early 
30s. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War they represented 5 percent of all 
Athenians in this age-band. Their organisation was closely modelled on the hoplite 
corps. They were likewise divided into 10 tribal units. Each tribe of horsemen was 
commanded by a phylarch, while 2 hipparchs commanded the corps as a whole. 
Horsemen were also conscripted for a campaign in the same way: their phylarch put 
their names on a conscription-list. Yet this tribal commander, when compiling his list, 
could consult a central record of corps-members. What made the maintenance of this 
record possible was the cavalry-corps’s small size. The state subsidised much more 
heavily the corps-membership of the 200 mounted archers. Postwar Athens paid them 
double what it gave the horsemen. This suggests that these corps-members did not 
come from the same wealthy backgrounds. Athenians certainly served as mounted 
archers. Indeed there is no sure evidence that their ranks ever included metics. 
Nevertheless they did not serve beside the horsemen in the 10 tribes. Rather they served 
in their own unit under the command of a hipparch. We last hear of the mounted archers 
during the Corinthian War.  
 
2. The History of the Cavalry-Corps 
 
 On the eve of the Peloponnesian War Pericles reassured the Athenian dēmos 
(people) that they had the required armed forces to win (Thuc. 2.13.6-9). The second 
corps of which he spoke was the cavalry (8). At the time it consisted of 1000 horsemen 
and 200 hippotoxotai or mounted archers (Andoc. 3.5; Diod. Sic. 13.72.1). The 
classical Athenians saw the horsemen as this branch’s core group (e.g. Ar. Eq. 225, 
580; Dem. 14.3; Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.3).1 These 1000 hippeis (horsemen) were always 
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Athenian (e.g. Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.3, 6; Vect. 2.5).2 Their organisation was closely 
modelled on Cleisthenes’s army of hoplites. Because they were phulētai (tribesmen), 
they were likewise divided into 10 tribal units (e.g. Lys. 15.5; Xen. Hell. 2.4.31; Eq. 
Mag. 2.2, 8.7). Each phulē (tribe) of 100 horsemen was commanded by a phularkhos 
(phylarch).3 Two hipparkhoi (hipparchs) held overall command (e.g. Ar. Av. 798-800; 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.4; Xen. Eq. Mag. 3.11). The Athenians only deployed a part of this 
corps at any one time. Thucydides wrote of them sending out, for example, 250, 300, 
400 or 600 of its members.4 Horsemen were conscripted for a campaign in the same 
way as hoplites: their names were put on katalogoi or conscription-lists (Lys. 16.13).5 
Of the two sets of cavalry-commanders the phylarchs had the most-detailed knowledge 
of corps-members (6-7). They worked out the place of each conscript in his tribe’s 
battle formation (15.5). Consequently it is more likely that the phylarchs compiled the 
conscription-lists. Yet in compiling his tribe’s katalogos a phylarch could consult a 
record that a taxiarch could not: a central record of hippeis ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 49.2; Lys. 
16.6).6 What made the upkeep of this record possible was the corps’s small size. Yet 
an Athenian’s membership in this wing still needed to be recorded in his deme (IG i3 
138.1-6). This ensured that his demarch would not accidentally include him among 
possible conscripts for hoplite service.   
 In 392/1 Andocides negotiated a peace-treaty for ending the Corinthian War 
(Andoc. 3.33-5).7 On his return from Sparta he spoke in favour of it. In a genuine 
speech he told assemblygoers that the cavalry-corps had been created in two stages (3, 
5).8 The treaty that had ended the Peloponnesian War led to the overthrow of Athenian 
democracy (e.g. Lys. 2.61-4; Xen. Hell. 2.2-4). Andocides had to convince the 
assemblygoers that it would not happen again (3.1). Consequently he claimed that there 
had been three earlier treaties with Sparta and that each had strengthened Athens’s 
armed forces (2.4, 6, 10). The first, for example, saw the establishment, «for the first 
time (prōton)», of a corps of 300 hippeis (5). After the second they expanded this corps 
to 1200 (7). Andocides argued that his peace-treaty would similarly make their military 
stronger (39-40). His account of fifth-century history contains «remarkable historical 
                                                          
2
 Whitehead 1977, p. 82.  
3
 E.g. Ar. Lys. 561-2; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.5; Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.21, 25; 3.4-7; IG i3 1190.179.  
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 For the references see e.g. Bugh 1988, pp. 79-107.  
5
 For the use of such lists in the conscription of hoplites see e.g. Christ 2001, pp. 398-403.  
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 Bugh 1988, pp. 55, 141 s. The much greater size of the hoplite corps made the upkeep of a 
central list of its members impossible (e.g. Hansen 1986, pp. 83-9; Christ 2001, pp. 400 s.; Crowley 
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7
 Asmonti 2015, p. 175.  
8
 E. M. Harris (2000) argues that Andoc. 3 is not a genuine speech but a later rhetorical exercise. 
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and chronological errors».9 His first two treaties look to be a double counting of the 
thirty-year peace of 446/5.10 To them Andocides linked military reforms that had been 
introduced decades earlier.11 In view of such egregious errors M. A. Martin famously 
dismissed Andocides’s speech as unreliable evidence.12 Martin proposed instead that a 
corps of 1200 horsemen had been created in one go during the 440s.13 Yet the discovery 
of IG i3 511 on the Acropolis unexpectedly corroborated Andocides’s two stages.14 
This inscription states that the dedication of which it was once part was set up by «the 
horsemen» (1). It gives the names of 3 hipparchs (1-3). We have seen that the 1200-
strong corps had only 2 hipparchs. But each of its phylarchs commanded a unit of 100. 
Therefore it has been plausibly suggested that the inscription’s 3 hipparchs were the 
unit-commanders of the first 300-strong corps.15   
 This inscription may corroborate Andocides’s claim that the Athenians created 
their cavalry-corps in two stages. But neither source sheds light on when exactly these 
stages occurred: IG i3 511 cannot be dated more precisely than to the mid-fifth century, 
while Andocides’s chronology is manifestly error ridden. The Parthenon provides a 
firm date by which the second stage had been completed. The horsemen participated 
in the pompē (procession) of the Great Panathenaea (e.g. Xen. Eq. Mag. 3.1-2).16 Their 
participation was the focus of this temple’s frieze. It depicts 10 distinct units of 
horsemen.17 Slight variations in the dress further distinguish the units from each other. 
This seems to be a depiction of the 10 phulai (tribes) of the 1200-strong corps. Most 
of the Parthenon, including its frieze, was completed by 438/7, when the temple’s 
builders were transferred to the Propylaea (Paus. 1.24.5-7; Plut. Per. 13.7; IG i3 462-
6).18  
 G. B. Bugh plausibly links the corps’s development to two setbacks that Athens 
suffered before 438/7. The first was the battle of Tanagra in 458/7 (Thuc. 1.106-7). 
During this battle the Thessalians, who were providing the cavalry for Athens (102.4), 
deserted to the Spartan side (Diod. Sic. 11.80.1-6). The resultant defeat made plain that 
Athens really needed to create its own corps of horsemen.19 The second setback was 
the Peloponnesian League’s unopposed invasion of Attica in 447/6 (Thuc. 1.114.2; 
2.21). This showed the dēmos that a 300-strong corps was not enough, if they wanted 
successfully to counter such invasions.20 Pollux suggested that the 48 naukrariai of 
                                                          
9
 Harris 2000, pp. 480-487, 497-501; Bäbler 2005, p. 115; Rhodes 2016, p. 83. The quotation 
comes from Plassart 1913, p. 152.  
10
 On this peace see e.g. Rhodes 2010, pp. 56-58.  
11
 Plassart 1913, pp. 152-154; Thomas 1989, pp. 119-123.  
12
 Martin 1886, pp. 367 s.  
13
 Martin 1886, pp. 121-134.  
14
 On it see e.g. Bugh 1988, pp. 45-50; Spence 1993, pp. 14-15; 2010, p. 119.  
15
 E.g. Bugh 1988, pp. 49 s.; Spence 1993, pp. 14 s.  
16
 Shear 2000, pp. 128-130; Stevenson 2003, pp. 248-251.  
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 Boardman 1977, p. 40; Spence 1993, pp. 267-271; Stevenson 2003, pp. 242-252.  
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 Camp 2001, pp. 74-82.  
19
 Bugh 1988, pp. 41-44.  
20
 Bugh 1988, p. 76; Pritchard 2010, p. 49; Spence 2010, pp. 119-138.  
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sixth-century Athens each supplied 1 warship and 2 horsemen (8.108).21 But what this 
Roman-period author wrote about these archaic units is directly contradicted by 
classical-period authors (e.g. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 8.3; 21.5; Hdt. 5.71.2).22 Consequently 
there is no reason to doubt Andocides’s depiction of the 300-strong corps as Athens’s 
first publicly controlled cavalry force (3.5; cf. Hdt. 6.112).23  
 
3. The Recruitment of the Horsemen  
 
In the 360s Xenophon wrote a how-to guide for Athenian hipparchs. His treatise 
noted that the state required its hippeis to be ready to fight as soon as a war broke out 
(Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.2, 9-10; 9.3). Xenophon emphasised that serving well required 
constant training (e.g. 1.5-6, 18, 21; 4.4; 8.1-8).24 The cavalry-corps, he noted, gave 
regular public displays of its horsemanship (1.26; 3.1-7, 9-14). In its entirety it 
participated in the processions and the agōnes (contests) of several festivals (2.8-3.4).25 
Therefore service as a hippeus (horseman) was physically demanding and, it seems, 
time-consuming. This made it suitable really only for young men (e.g. Ar. Eq. 731; 
Eup. fr. 293 Kassel and Austin; Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.2, 11).26 Yet the hipparchs were 
allowed to recruit only those who had turned 20 years of age, because the state 
preferred to keep hoi neōtatoi (the youngest) away from active-military service (e.g. 
Thuc. 2.13.7).27 Recruits had to pass the council’s annual dokimasia (scrutiny) of 
corps-members before they could join.28 During this scrutiny councillors voted on 
whether individuals were capable of being hippeis or should be allowed to retire from 
the corps.29 Those who passed it were supposed to serve only in the cavalry-corps until 
they retired (Lys. 15.7-8).   
 Xenophon recognised that this recruitment had to follow an established law (Eq. 
Mag. 1.9-10). This nomos required a hipparch to recruit only from «those who were 
most able in terms of money and physical capacity». Under it he could use a law-court 
to force those who met these criteria to join up. But Xenophon’s advice was that it 
should be used as little as possible (10-11). Instead a hipparch should try to persuade 
neoi (young men) to volunteer by talking about the brilliancy of horsemanship (11; cf. 
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 Rhodes 1981, pp. 151 s.  
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 Amit 1965, pp. 19, 99-101; Gabrielsen 1985; 1994, pp. 19-24; de Souza 1998, p. 292 n. 47; 
Pritchard 2010a, p. 10; Spence 2010, p. 117 n. 33; Aperghios 2013, pp. 9-10. Contra van Wees 2013, 
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 Pace Bugh 1988, pp. 1-38; Spence 1993, pp. 8-12.  
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 Spence 1993, pp. 76-79; 2010, p. 117. Pace van Wees 2004, p. 212.  
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 For its competing at the Great Panathenaea see e.g. Kyle 1987, pp. 189 s.; Pritchard 2015, p. 
36; Shear 2001: 340-345.  
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 Bugh 1988, pp. 64-66; Spence 1993, pp. 198-202.  
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 Pischedda 2013, p. 80. The neōtatoi were the precursors of the fourth century’s ephebes 
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 This dokimasia was well established by the 390s (Lys. 14.8, 10, 15-17, 22; 15.6-7; 16.13). 
The council’s conducting of this scrutiny is first attested only in the 320s ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 49.2). 
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12, 14), it is likely that it had always scrutinised the cavalry-corps’s recruits.  
29
 Rhodes 1981, pp. 564-568 ; Bugh 1988, pp. 53-55.  
 Page 5 
 
 
Ar. Av. 1441-3).With their fathers an economic argument should be used (Xen. Eq. 
Mag. 11-12). A hipparch, Xenophon writes, can remind fathers «how they will be 
compelled to keep horses (hippotrophein), if not by you, then, by reason of their 
money, by someone else». A hipparch can assure them that if their «boys» join up, he 
will put a stop to «their expensive and frenzied horse-buying» (12). Two aspects of this 
recruitment stand out. The first is that the hipparchs only rarely had to compel those 
who were liable for cavalry service to serve. For Xenophon most recruits could be 
persuaded voluntarily to do so. The second is that Solon’s income-classes played no 
role.30 This explains why hippeis in classical-Athenian sources are members of either 
Solon’s second highest income-class or the cavalry-corps.31 The term was never 
simultaneously used to describe both groups. Xenophon provides the earliest evidence 
for how Athenian hippeis were recruited. Much else of what he saw in the cavalry-
corps of the 360s is first attested before the Peloponnesian War’s end. It is likely that 
the recruitment-method of his day dated back just as far.    
 
3. The State Subsidisation of Corps-Membership 
 
 By the 360s the state had long helped its young citizens to participate in the 
cavalry-corps. This came in the form of two subsidies.32 A close look at how each 
subsidy reduced the personal cost of corps-membership allows us to work out which 
stratum of Athenian citizens could afford to be hippeis. This makes it possible to 
identify «those who were most able in terms of money» on whom a hipparch focussed 
his recruitment-efforts. The first subsidy that each recruit received was a katastasis 
(establishment loan) of up to 1200 drachmas (dr.) for his warhorse (e.g. Lys. 16.6-7).33 
We first hear of this loan in the 420s (e.g. Eup. fr. 293).34 But both subsidies, 
presumably, were introduced as part of the corps’s expansion in the later 440s. 
Certainly they would made it easier to find the three times more recruits that were now 
required. A horseman had to pay back his katastasis only at his retirement. 
Consequently it might have been possible to reduce what he owed the state by selling 
his warhorse. The most-reliable evidence for the cost of such horses comes from the 
lead tablets of the cavalry-headquarters that were discovered in the wells of the agora 
(civic centre) and the Ceramicus.35 They recorded market value of each corps-
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 Bugh 1988, pp. 20-34; Spence 1993, p. 182 ; de Sainte Croix 2004, pp. 25 s; Pritchard 2010, 
p. 25.  
31
 For the first usage see e.g. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.4; Thuc. 3.16.1. For the second see e.g. Ar. Eq. 
225, 550; Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.2, 3.  
32
 Migeotte 2014, pp. 559-563.  
33
 Bugh 1988, pp. 56 s.; Spence 1993, pp. 183, 279; Pritchard 2010, pp. 48 s.; Spence 2010, pp. 
113 s.; Pischedda 2013, pp. 81 s.  
34
 With Spence 2010, pp. 121 s.  
35
 Braun 1970, pp. 129-132, 198-269; Kroll 1977. On this headquarters see Bugh 1988, pp. 219 
s.  
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member’s horse.36 The prices of the 19 fourth-century tables that are legible average 
408 dr.37  
 A horseman also had his own slave hippokomos (groom), who cared for his horse, 
and carried his equipment and supplies on campaign (Thuc. 7.75.5; Xen. Eq. Mag. 4.4; 
5.6).38 Such personal servants never fought alongside their masters in battle (e.g. Xen. 
Eq. Mag. 2.6).39 A safe estimate for how much a horseman spent on his slave’s horse 
is probably 100 dr. This is the lowest recorded price for a horse in the cavalry-archive 
and literary sources (Ar. Nub. 21-3; Isae. 5.43; Lys. 7.10; Xen. An. 7.8.6).  
 Horsemen probably retired after 10 to 15 years.40 By their early 30s they would 
have found increasingly difficult the physical demands of training and campaigning 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 49.2; Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.2, 9). Many now had new social 
responsibilities as the kurioi (masters) of households, while some, no doubt, had started 
political careers. Significantly the average depreciation of a warhorse was 100 dr. per 
year.41 This meant that a corps-member could have used the sale of his horse to reduce 
his katastasis only if he retired within 3 to 4 years. It is most likely that the council 
would not have let a horsemen retire so far short of a regular service-period. Therefore 
hippeis ultimately had to pay for their horses and those of their slave grooms out of 
their own pockets.42  
 Xenophon wrote that the Athenian state spent «nearly 40 talents (t.)» to have a 
cavalry-corps that was always ready for battle (Eq. Mag. 1.19). This sum provided 
year-round pay for 1000 horsemen at the rate of 4 obols (ob.) per day.43 This misthos 
(pay) was the second subsidy that the state gave corps-members. What survives of 
Against Theozotides by Lysias confirms that this daily rate of 4 ob. went back to the 
last years of the fifth century. This speech attacked Theozotides for two proposals that 
he had put to the assembly in, most probably, 403/2.44 A fragment shows that one of 
them was about the misthos of horsemen (fr. 6.73-9 Gernet and Bizos): «On war this 
Theozotides put forward the motion that the hippeis would receive as pay 
(misthophorein) 4 ob. instead of 1 dr. and the mounted archers 8 ob. instead of 2 dr.».45 
In 403/2 the Athenians faced a significant shortfall in their state budget (Lys. 30.22).46 
At the same time they simply loathed their cavalry-corps (e.g. Lys. 16.6-7; Xen. Hell. 
3.1.4), because its members had committed violent crimes as part of the oligarchy of 
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 Kroll 1977, pp. 97-100.  
37
 Spence 1993, pp. 274-277.  
38
 Pischedda 2013, p. 79.  
39
 Welwei 1974, I p. 88; Hunt 1998, pp. 1-101; Crowley 2012, p. 199 n. 283. 
40
 Bugh 1988, pp. 62-75, 158; Pischedda 2013, p. 80.   
41
 Kroll 1977, pp. 93-99.  
42
 Spence 1993, p. 183.  
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 Kroll 1977, pp. 97-98 n. 36; Loomis 1998, p. 51. Contra Pischedda 2013, pp. 82-84.  
44
 Stroud 1971, pp. 297-301; Migeotte 2014, p. 561. 
45
 With Loomis 1995.  
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404/3.47 Consequently it is not so surprising that assemblygoers accepted the proposal 
of Theozotides to target this corps for spending-cuts (Lys. fr. 6.79-81).  
 This fragment confirms that Athenian horsemen had earned 50 percent more 
before this speech. Misthos for the corps’s core group of 1000 was probably halved as 
it was for the other military wings in 412/11.48 Therefore, before this last date, the 
corps’s core group of 1000 could have been paid 3 times what they would earn during 
the Corinthian War (cf. Thuc. 5.47.6). At this higher rate their misthos probably 
accounted for 10 percent of the state’s annual income.49 Certainly pay for them was 
introduced before 434/3 (IG i3 138.7-9).  
 
4. The Social Background of the Horsemen 
 
 The cavalry-corps demanded a lot of time from its members. Even in peacetime 
they constantly trained and engaged in public activities. In times of war they often had 
to drop everything for an immediate deployment. These time-demands would have 
made it difficult for them to run farms or businesses. Importantly pay of 4 ob. was not 
enough to cover a horseman’s day-to-day expenses. I. G. Spence has carefully 
calculated how a member of the fourth-century corps had to spend between 3 ob. and 
1 dr. per day (and considerably more during shortages) on grain for his horse and that 
of his hippokomos.50 He did not receive any extra pay on campaign either. There is 
simply no evidence for the old view that hippeis earned 1 dr. per day in the field.51 In 
an assembly-speech of 352/1 Demosthenes proposed that the horsemen of the year-
round amphibious forces that he was proposing should receive 1 dr. (4.28-9). But his 
whole proposal was rejected by the dēmos.52 In a treatise from around the same time 
Xenophon implied that the cavalry-corps’s pay-rate had long remained unchanged 
(Vect. 6.1). After 403/2 what Athens paid corps-members usually only paid for their 
horses. Consequently it was the citizens who did not have to earn a living that were the 
most able to be hippeis. The classical Athenians believed that such skholē (leisure) was 
the preserve of the wealthy (e.g. Ar. Plut. 281; Vesp. 552-7; Men. Dys. 293-5).53  
 Wealthy Athenians usually had family homes not only in their ancestral demes 
but also in the city or the Piraeus (e.g. Aeschin. 1.97; Isae. 11.40-3; Lys. 20.11-12).54 
The cavalry-corps’s peacetime activities took place in or near the astu (urban centre).55 
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 Bugh 1988, pp. 120-153; Spence 1993, pp. 216-224; Low 2002, pp. 108, 115-116; Pischedda 
2013, p. 81.  
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50
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The wealthy’s ability to live close to them was another reason why they were more 
able than the poor to be horsemen. Certainly a much smaller percentage of Athenians 
served as hippeis than as hoplites.56 The former were aged between 20 and 32.5 years. 
We simply lack the evidence to reconstruct the age-structure of the ancient Greeks. 
This means that we can only estimate the percentage of citizens in this age-band on the 
basis of a model-life table and the assumption of a stable population.57 The most used 
tables of this kind were formulated by A. Coale and P. Demeny in the 1960s.58 M. H. 
Hansen has pioneered their use for ancient Greek demography.59 Of the Coale–Demeny 
tables Hansen shows that the model-west table with mortality-level 4 best suits the 
conditions of antiquity.60 On this model-life table those who are aged between 20 and 
32.5 years account for 37.2 percent.61 At the time that Xenophon wrote his guide for 
hipparchs the number of adult citizens living in was approaching 30,000.62 Of this last 
figure 37.2 percent is 11,160. Therefore in the mid-fourth century the 1000 horsemen 
represented 9.0 percent of those in their age-band.   
 Before 412/11 Athenian horsemen were probably paid treble. Daily misthos of 2 
dr. per day could have also covered their own living-expenses. It would have removed 
a barrier to non-elite participation in the cavalry-corps. Nevertheless belonging to this 
branch was still a lot more expensive than participating in the hoplite corps. Admittedly 
some of the participation-costs were comparable. A horseman was also responsible for 
his own arms and armour (e.g. Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.23).63 He was also expected to bring a 
slave with him on campaign. But a hippeus had to buy his horse and another for his 
groom. Together they cost around 500 dr. This was the equivalent of 2 years of wages 
for a skilled labourer. The need for horses made being a horseman roughly 10 times 
more expensive than being a hoplite.64 Of course the state could lend him the money 
to buy his warhorse. But he was required to pay it all back at his retirement. This must 
have been daunting to everyone except those who knew that they would inherit enough 
to cover a katastasis. From the corps’s creation in the 450s the cost of horses was 
clearly another reason why the wealthy were most able to join up.  
 There is no doubt that the fifth century’s hippeis were more prosperous as a group 
than the hoplites. The first indication of this is the poll tax that Athens imposed on its 
land forces in order to pay for the Lyceum’s maintenance. They used this athletics field 
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 In the late 430s 30 percent of Athenians in the age-band for active military service were 
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 For the cost of a hoplite’s kit see e.g. van Wees 2004, pp. 52, 267 n. 14; Hunt 2007, p. 116; 
Crowley 2012, p. 31.   
 Page 9 
 
 
for musters before going on a campaign (Ar. Pax 354-5).65 This tax, which was 
introduced before 434/3, was levied at 2 dr. per year for horsemen, 1 dr. for hoplites 
and 3 ob. for archers (IG i3 138.1-4).66 These different rates, presumably, were based 
on what the members of each corps could pay. The second indication comes from 
Aristophanes. His Knights of 425/4 characterised the core group of 1000 hippeis as 
wealthy (e.g. 225, 266, 579-80, 842, 1369-72; cf. Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.5-6).67 At the 
outbreak of the Peloponnesian there were 60,000 adult Athenians living in Attica.68 
This suggests that in 432/1 these 1000 horsemen represented only 4.5 percent of those 
in their age-band.  
 Clearly ‘those who were most able in terms of money’ were the wealthy. 
Therefore a hipparch would have focussed his recruitment-efforts on this social class. 
Simply belonging to it made a physically fit young Athenian liable for service as a 
horseman. The dēmos, no doubt, introduced this liability at the same time as they 
expanded the cavalry-corps. It served as another means for them to find the extra 
recruits that were now required. Yet the Athenian state never set an income or property 
qualification for elite-membership.69 It simply lacked the means of independently 
assessing the personal wealth of its citizens.70 Instead being identified as wealthy was 
a matter of perception: a citizen belonged to this stratum if he and his family did what 
the wealthy normally did. Elite Athenians set themselves apart by paying the eisphora 
and performing expensive liturgies.71 The eisphora was an intermittent tax on property 
to pay for war. The wealthy also pursued pastimes that were too expensive and time-
consuming for the poor.72 One such pastime was hippotrophia (horse-keeping).73 The 
hipparchs usually drew recruits from families that already engaged in it (e.g. Eup. fr. 
293; Lys. 19.63; Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.6). Classical-period writers saw hippotrophia as a 
sign of wealth.74 Aristotle wrote that it was «not easy to do for those who were not 
wealthy» (Pol. 1289b33-6).  
 Consequently wealthy young Athenians expected that they would keep horses 
(e.g. Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.12). Their fathers, however, who knew that they would have to 
pick up the bill, shared the popular concern that the hippotrophia of a son could ruin a 
family’s fortune.75 It is significant that the state’s subsidisation of participation in the 
cavalry-corps could reduce what an elite family spent on horses. If a son joined up, his 
                                                          
65
 Christ 2001, p. 407; Pritchard 2013, p. 159.  
66
 On its date see Jameson 1980, p. 216; Pritchard 2015, p. 18.   
67
 Bugh 1988, p. 222; Pischedda 2013, p. 77.   
68
 Rhodes 1988, pp. 271-277; Hansen 1991, p. 55; Rhodes 2010, pp. 162, 203.  
69
 Pritchard 2013, pp. 7, 75 s.; Roubineau 2015, pp. 98-102.  
70
 Amit 1965, pp. 109 s.; Hansen 1991, p. 111; Gabrielsen 1994, pp. 44-53; Christ 2007, p. 
57.  
71
 For the wealthy as liturgists see e.g. Davies 1981, pp. 9-14. For their paying of the eisphora 
see e.g. Antiph. 2.3.8; Ar. Eq. 923-6; Dem. 4.7; 10.37; 27.66; Lys. 22.13; 27.9-10; Christ 2007, p. 54.  
72
 Pritchard 2013, pp. 4-6; Roubineau 2015, pp. 89-94.  
73
 Davies 1981, p. vi; Spence 1993, pp. 191-193; 2010, p. 112.  
74
 E.g. Aesch. PV 465-6; Arist. Pol. 1321a5-15; Pl. Meno 70a-b; Isae. 5.43. 
75
 E.g. Ar. Nub. 1-24, 97-9, 112-13; Pax 135-9; Hyper. 1.16; Thuc. 6.12.2, 15.3; Pritchard 2013, 
pp. 133-136.  
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father knew that he would have one less horse to feed. He could reasonably expect that 
it would eventually be his son who would pay for his warhorse either out of his 
inheritance or when he had become the kurios (master) of their household. He could 
hope that by being a horsemen his son would satisfy his expectation about hippotrophia 
and so be less inclined to ask for more horses. Wealthy families had a clear financial 
incentive for urging their sons to be part of the cavalry-corps.   
 In his recruiting-efforts, however, a hipparch did not always get his way. An 
individual who had been targeted as a possible recruit presumably could be let off, if 
he could not afford to service. This, certainly, was the case in 320s ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
49.2). But asking for such an exemption could come at a high social price: if, in spite 
of the state’s subsidies, an individual was still not able to be a horseman, it was clear 
that he and his family sat below the stratum that engaged in hippotrophia. 
Consequently refusing to serve cast into serious doubt a family’s claim of elite-
membership. The state’s efforts to get elite Athenians to serve as hippeis thus had two 
sides: it subsidised the hippotrophia of those who joined up and ensured that those who 
refused to do so faced a credible risk of a loss of social standing.   
 
5. Epilogue: The Mounted Archers 
 
 The cavalry-corps gained 200 hippotoxotai as part of its expansion in the later 
440s (Andoc. 3.5; Thuc. 2.13.8). The horses that these mounted archers rode were 
owned by the state (Lys. 15.5).76 Consequently they were not required to pay back a 
katastasis. After 412/11 they were always paid twice as much as the 1000 horsemen 
(Lys. fr. 6.73-81).77 This heavier state subsidisation suggests that the hippotoxotai were 
considerably less able personally to bear the cost of their corps-membership.78 It 
strengthens the case that they were not part of the elite from which the horsemen came 
(e.g. Lys. 15.6; Pl. Leg. 834d). Athenians certainly served as mounted archers (e.g. 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 24.3). Indeed there is no unequivocal evidence that metics served 
alongside them.79 Hippotoxotai could be deployed independently of the rest of the 
corps. In 416/15 30 mounted archers served by themselves at Melos where they were 
used «for raiding isolated farms and hamlets perhaps» (Thuc. 5.84.1-2).80 They, like 
the peripoloi (patrollers), could, it seems, be sent out as Attica’s first defenders during 
                                                          
76
 With Bugh 1988, p. 135.  
77
 With Loomis 1995.  
78
 Bugh 1988, p. 223.  
79
 Pace Spence 2010, p. 112. The only possible evidence is IG i3 1192.158-9 where a name, 
after ‘mounted archers’, is added below a tribal list of the year’s casualties. On 3 other casualty lists 
the names of archers were likewise added (1147.67-70; 1184.79-88; 1186.80). D. W. Bradeen argued 
that none of them was Athenian (1969, pp. 149-50). But the majority view is that they were (e.g. 
Plassart 1913, pp. 196, 211; Jordan 1975, pp. 203-210; Loraux 1986, pp. 34, 360-361 n. 24; Bugh 
1988, p. 221; Connor 1988, p. 26; Trundle 2010, p. 151).  
80
 Quotation from Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1970, p. 155.  
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an enemy invasion (Ar. Av. 1177-8).81 They were also, of course, deployed as part of 
larger cavalry forces (e.g. Thuc. 6.94.4). In such deployments they were not spread 
across the 10 phulai, but formed their own unit under the command of a hipparch (Xen. 
Mem. 3.3.1). By the time that Xenophon wrote his guide for such commanders 
hippotoxotai were no longer a part of the cavalry-corps. We last hear of them during 
the Corinthian War (Lys. 15.5-6).82  
 
David M. Pritchard 
 
L’Université de Strasbourg   
 





                                                          
81
 For Ober (1985, pp. 91 s.) and Plassart (1913, pp. 206 s.) this passage shows that the 
hippotoxotai formed part of the peripoloi-corps. The alla (‘but’), however, of line 1178 makes clear 
that Aristophanes was distinguishing between the two (Denniston 1954, p. 6).  
82
 Plassart 1913, p. 205.  
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